Celebrating 30 years of legal recognition for veganism

RAC member, Dr Jeanette Rowley, explores the importance of human rights to legal protection for vegans under British equality law

1. Introduction

On 10 February 1993, the former Commission of The European Court of Human Rights (Second Chamber) considered the admissibility of an application submitted in 1991, by a vegan prisoner from the United Kingdom (UK). The applicant, CW, complained that the UK prison authorities required them to work in the prison print shop, which, they claimed, used dyes that had been tested on non-human animals. CW protested that working with the dyes would contravene their vegan beliefs. During its deliberations, the Commission found that veganism is within the legal meaning of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights: the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

The meaning and scope of Article 9—the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion—as explained by the court, along with wider treaty obligations observed by British courts, are fundamental to the development of further protection for vegans in Britain. In the recent confirmation that veganism was protected under British equality law, Judge Postle observed the obligation to defer to the convention and human rights obligations and commented (inter alia) that it would be bizarre and unlawful if a belief were recognised under the conventions but not under the Equality Act 2010 (see section 12 below).

In celebration of 30 years of legal recognition for veganism, this article explains the significance of Article 9 to the protection of vegans, the current scope of protection for vegans in Britain and how the use of law to protect vegans encourages the development of policies and practices that support vegans and help advance veganism.

2. The human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion

Legal recognition for vegans is rooted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights under Article 18, the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The declaration of this right by the international community is given legal effect in international human rights treaties, including Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 9 of the convention—the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion— is set out as follows:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Part 1 of Article 9 grants an absolute right to hold a belief. Part 2 states the reasons under which interference with an individual’s practice of their beliefs can be held to be lawful. The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is a primary human right, and interference with a person’s manifestation of their lawful beliefs, as can be seen, is strictly limited. For interference to be lawful, it must be grounded in law that is required in a democracy and for any of the stated reasons in 9(2) above.

3. The application of Article 9 to the 1993 case

In the case concerning the prisoner CW, the commission of the court noted that the UK had not contested that veganism is capable of concerning "conscience" or "belief" within the legal meaning of the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and following their deliberations, the commission did indeed find that vegan convictions with regard to animal products fall within the scope of Article 9(1) of the convention. However, the commission was also satisfied that any interference with the applicant’s practical expression of veganism under Article 9(2) was lawful. There was some uncertainty about the composition and testing of the dyes,[1] and the requirement that all prisoners work in the print shop was supported by the Prison Rules in the interests of good order. Interference with the applicant's freedom to manifest their vegan belief, if, indeed, it could be established that there was any interference, was deemed to be lawful and proportional and the requirement to work in the prison print shop was not, in this case, deemed unlawful interference.

4. The importance of the case

Although the commission concluded that CW’s application was inadmissible, it nevertheless established that the beliefs of vegans could be defended, respected and protected under Article 9. This landmark finding, three decades ago in 1993, explicitly supporting veganism and vegans across Europe, meant that the inclusion of veganism as a belief within the legal meaning of Article 9, would be included in authoritative guidance, published by the court. This guidance, which lists veganism as relevant to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, aims to support signatories of the convention by explaining the meaning of human rights provisions and helping them understand and enact their human rights obligations in the interests of determining common public policy. The guidance is, therefore, important across Europe.

The validation of veganism in the case law and guidance of the court mean that vegans can cite powerful authority to defend their right to live their daily lives according to their moral convictions. In addition, the convention generally, and observance of the scope of Article 9 specifically, has been significant to the development and application of related law in Britain and underpins the recent confirmation that veganism is protected under British equality law. The following sections explain the scope of Article 9, its application and its importance in the development of further, explicit protection for vegans in Britain.

5. The legal meaning of thought, conscience, and religion

The European Court of Human Right’s jurisprudence explained in previous cases that the legal meaning of ‘belief’, intrinsic to Article 9, denotes views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance, and that qualifying non-religious philosophical convictions must concern a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour, be worthy of respect in a democratic society, not be incompatible with human dignity, and must not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. These criteria, used by the court to determine whether a belief qualifies for protection, would later be adopted as the established legal test for the protection of beliefs under British equality law and are intrinsic to confirmation of protection for veganism.

6. The importance of convention rights and Article 9 in UK law

The rights granted by the convention are given effect in the UK by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). The human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion—Article 9— is of such great significance to the mission of human rights that section 13 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires a court (including tribunals) to give special attention to the importance of this convention right when making a decision that might affect an individual’s practice of their beliefs. In addition, section 3(1) requires legislation to be read and applied so as to be compatible with convention rights and section 6(1) states that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a convention right. Section 6(6) states that 'act' includes a failure to act, which indicates the positive obligation to ensure convention rights are accessible to vegans. The Human rights Act 1998 also reiterates the prohibition of discrimination provided under Article 14 of the Convention: 'the enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground...'

These principles mean that public bodies in the UK, such as schools, the police, prisons, NHS hospitals and care homes, are prohibited from unlawfully behaving in a way that prevents vegans from being vegan, they must ensure that they accommodate the reasonable requests of vegans wherever possible and that they do not discriminate against vegans. In 2005, it was declared in the House of Lords that even vegetarianism was an uncontroversial example of a belief that would fall within the scope of Article 9. Case law also confirms that power over an individual’s practice of their lawful beliefs cannot be assumed by anyone who might want to determine what the belief means or how it should be manifested.

The rights made available in the Human Right Act 1998, and various additional provisions, support protection for vegans from unlawful interference when in relationships with public authorities. For example, in the absence of acceptable justification, vegan detainees and prisoners cannot be denied vegan food. Vegan police officers, nurses, firefighters and prison guards cannot be prevented from wearing vegan-friendly uniform shoes and boots and schools cannot encourage vegan pupils to renounce veganism or require them to participate in the exploitation of non-human animals. Further, combined with the convention right to education, vegan parents and guardians are entitled to respect for the vegan-inclusive educational needs of their children.

7. The impact of the court’s finding that veganism attracts protection under the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion

The explicit inclusion of veganism as a qualifying belief protected under human rights law,  is taken seriously and is correctly referenced on the website of the British Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC). The Equality and Human Rights Commission was established by the Equality Act 2006, is independent of government, and is tasked with monitoring human rights and equality measures in the interests of fairness and justice.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission explains that the meaning of religion and belief in the Equality Act 2010 is broad and is consistent with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It also entrenched in its Statutory Code of Practice, the criteria used by the Court to determine a qualifying philosophical belief (see section 5 above).

Because the European Court of Human Rights had included veganism in the scope of Article 9, and the UK had a duty to defer to the convention and the jurisprudence of the Court, the EHRC ensured that veganism was properly referenced and promoted before the commencement of the Equality Act 2010.

Prior to the consolidation of various equality laws into one Equality Act (2010), the Equality and Human Rights Commission produced a Draft Code of Practice (employment) for consultation. In this draft, the commission explained the broad scope of meaning given to the protected characteristic ‘religion and belief’ in the Act and reiterated that protection under this provision is consistent with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It went on to explain the ethical nature of veganism, that vegan beliefs are likely to qualify for protection and gave examples of how employers might consider accommodating vegan employees. This draft guidance, which was published prior to the commencement of the Equality Act 2010, explained that:

A person who is a vegan chooses not to use or consume animal products of any kind. That person eschews the exploitation of animals for food, clothing, accessories or any other purpose and does so out of an ethical commitment to animal welfare. This person is likely to hold a belief which is covered by the Act.

It went on to offer an example of accommodating the needs of vegans:

A big, multicultural firm has provided each kitchen area with a vegan space and a non-vegan space. Each space has a fridge, sink with cleaning cloths, microwave, separate utensils and crockery all of which are colour coded either green for the vegan spaces or red for the non-vegan spaces. Staff members are strongly encouraged to use the spaces appropriately in order to respect the beliefs of their vegan colleagues.

This example illustrated how employers should interpret the scope of protection that would likely be offered under the forthcoming Equality Act 2010, by explicitly supporting the accommodation of vegans in employment contexts. The explanation of veganism and the example provided were grounded in the fact that veganism was protected under human rights law and relevant, therefore, to the existing Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 and the Equality Act 2006, both of which aligned with the principles of Article 9 by providing protection for philosophical beliefs.

The following sections explain the significance of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights to the development of protection for philosophical beliefs under British equality law, and its relationship to explicit (and wider) protection for veganism when a case was brought under the relevant provisions of the Equality Act 2010.

8. British courts adopt the approach of the European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning ‘belief’

Around the same time as the Human Rights Commission was working on the Draft Code of Practice, in 2009, the Employment Appeals Tribunal in London was considering the case of Mr T Nicholson who brought a case of discrimination against his employer, Grainger Plc. Mr Nicholson explained that he had a strongly held philosophical belief about climate change and the environment. He believed that ‘we must urgently cut carbon emissions to avoid catastrophic climate change’.

The case was being brought under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 which provided that 'belief' means any religious or philosophical belief. In his consideration of the meaning of ‘philosophical belief, the tribunal judge emphasised the relevance and reiterated the legal scope and meaning of Article 9 of the convention and the obligation under human rights law to interpret the regulations to align with convention rights. The judge stated that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights was directly material and helpful and adopted the criteria developed by the court in Article 9 cases to determine whether a belief could qualify for protection in law. To qualify for protection under the 2003 employment equality rules, the tribunal deferred to the test developed at the European Court of Human Rights (see section 5 above):

(i) The belief must be genuinely held.

(ii) It must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available.

(iii) It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour.

(iv) It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.

(v) It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others.

On this test, formulated by the European Court of Human Rights, it was concluded that a belief in climate change is capable of constituting a “philosophical belief” within the meaning of the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. The test became known as the Grainger test.

9. Belief against fox hunting: further application of Article 9 and promise for vegans

The meaning of ‘philosophical belief’ was also considered in the later employment case of Joe Hashman, who was vegan and a hunt saboteur. In 2010, Mr Hashman brought a case of discrimination under the same 2003 regulations. In this case, it was acknowledged again that the relevant 2003 regulations derive from Article 9 of the convention and the tribunal followed the legal test adopted in the case of Mr Nicholson (above). In conclusion, the tribunal found that the applicant’s belief against fox hunting did meet the legal test. The belief was genuinely held, it derived from Mr Hashman’s philosophical beliefs in the sanctity of life and animal welfare, and affected every area of Mr Hashman’s life. The beliefs were held to be cogent, serious, coherent and important, recognised in democratic society, and did not interfere with the fundamental rights of others (a belief in fox hunting does not qualify for protection under Article 9).

It is also notable that the tribunal made it clear that Mr Hashman’s wider foundational vegan beliefs were significant. Mr Hashman had stated that:

People should live their lives with mindful respect for animals and we all have a moral obligation to live in a way which is kind to each other, our environment and our fellow creatures.

The tribunal judge said that Mr Hashman’s philosophical belief in the sanctity of life comprises beliefs in the value to life of veganism, environmentalism and animal rights activism. Here we see, for the first time, an exceptionally strong indication that veganism in its own right, might, one day, qualify for protection under British equality law grounded in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. At this time, however, a vegan had not yet brought a specific case of discrimination on the grounds of veganism to a tribunal.

These cases show how the scope of the Article 9 right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is relevant and important in British equality cases, and how it was applied in consideration of ‘philosophical belief’ associated with veganism prior to the Equality Act 2010 coming into force. It is clear that it was only a matter of time before a British court would, by aligning with the convention, rule in favour of veganism.

10. The Equality Act 2010: ongoing recognition of Article 9

The Equality Act 2010 consolidated and replaced a lot of existing equality legislation and, in part, restates prior rules relating to discrimination on the grounds of individual, personal characteristics. The Act prohibits direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and victimisation on the grounds of nine protected characteristics: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion and belief, sex and sexual orientation. The Act is applicable in employment, education and the provision of goods and services and includes a section explaining the particular duties applicable to the public sector: to eliminate unlawful discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between people with protected characteristics and those without protected characteristics.

The meaning of ‘belief’, under the Equality Act 2010, is any religious or philosophical belief and a reference to belief includes a reference to a lack of belief. As expected, accompanying guidance is consistent with that provided previously and explains that religious or philosophical belief has a broad definition in line with the freedom of thought, conscience and religion guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Statutory Code of Practice, as noted above, adopted the Grainger test, which derives from cases brought under Article 9 of the Convention.

11. Further support for veganism expressed in relation to the Equality Act 2010

In 2019, Mr G Conisbee, a vegetarian, alleged that he had suffered discrimination in the workplace on the grounds of religion or belief contrary to the Equality Act 2010. He relied heavily on the interconnection between Article 9 and British law, and argued that he had a qualifying belief in vegetarianism and should be protected from discrimination. The respondents in the case disputed that vegetarianism qualified for protection under the act, arguing that, although they did not contest Mr Conisbee’s genuine belief in and commitment to vegetarianism, a belief in vegetarianism was more of a lifestyle choice and did not meet the elements of the Grainger test. To support their arguments, the respondents referred to the convictions of vegans, who, they felt, may be more able to evidence the required level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance.

In this case, veganism is referenced twelve times, including in a statement from tribunal Judge Postle that:

Vegans simply do not accept the practice under any circumstances of eating meat, fish or dairy products, and have distinct concerns about the way animals are reared, the clear belief that killing and eating animals is contrary to a civilised society and also against climate control. There you can see a clear cogency and cohesion in vegan belief…

Ultimately, it was (controversially) decided in this case, that vegetarianism is not about human life and behaviour but is a lifestyle choice and it is not sufficiently cogent to meet the legal test.

12. Confirmation that veganism is protected under the Equality Act 2010

A year after Conisbee, in 2020, Judge Postle also presided over a preliminary hearing to determine whether ethical veganism can amount to a philosophical belief and, thus, a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010. This widely publicised case, which confirmed that ethical veganism was indeed a protected characteristic for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010, concerned Mr Casamitjana, who alleged that his employer had discriminated against him on the grounds of veganism contrary to the Equality Act 2010.

In this case, we see again the profound significance and importance of the human rights process and Article 9 of the Convention. The relevance of the 1993 case concerning CW, a vegan prisoner, was cited as an authority, and Judge Postle reiterated the relevance of the European Convention on Human Rights and the significance of the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as granted under Article 9. Judge Postle noted that:

• The relevant provisions of the Equality Act 2010 consciously mirror Article 9 of European Convention on Human Rights.
• The freedom to hold and manifest belief is to be enjoyed without discrimination as defined by Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
• Freedom of thought, conscience and religion as one of the foundations of a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention…is one of the most vital elements that goes to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life.
• Pursuant to Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, domestic legislation must be read insofar as possible to give effect to convention rights.
• It would be both bizarre and, by reason of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, unlawful if a belief were recognised under the conventions but not under the Equality Act 2010.
• Article 9 is not confined to the freedom to hold a belief but includes the right to express and practice one’s belief.

Also of significance in this case is The Vegan Society’s definition of veganism. This definition of veganism is:

[a] philosophy and way of life which seeks to exclude, as far as possible and practical, all forms of exploitation and cruelty to animals for food, clothing or any other purpose and by extension promotes the development and use of animal free alternatives for the benefit of humans / animals and the environment, in dietary terms it denotes the practice of dispensing with all products derived wholly or partly from animals.

Judge Postle commented that ‘[e]thical vegans could be said to be moralistically orientated and opposed to all forms of exploitation of all animals and to embody genuine philosophical concern for all sentient life.’ And, ‘[i]t is clear veganism is living according to a belief or conviction that it is wrong to exploit and kill living beings unnecessarily and that moral conviction is cogent, serious and important.’ In addition, Judge Postle identified that the definition of The Vegan Society functioned as a moral framework for Mr Casamitjana.

On the basis of the evidence presented, Judge Postle found it ‘easy to conclude that there is overwhelming evidence [before me] that ethical veganism is capable of being a philosophical belief and thus a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010.’ The case attracted a significant amount of publicity, which contributed enormously to awareness of the validation of veganism in law and the extension, by way of compliance with the scope of equality law, of protections to vegans in employment, education and as consumers of goods and services.

13: The benefits of the ruling for vegans experiencing unfair treatment

The ruling undoubtedly facilitated the relatively swift resolution of cases that might have previously been much more time consuming. Although no admission of breaches of law were admitted in published cases, vegans alleging discrimination under the act, such as Rob Roach,  Fiji Willetts and Paul Roberts were able to reference and rely on the Equality Act 2010, to support their Article 9 rights, and, where the relationship was with a public body, also invoke their Article 9 convention rights and the Public Sector Equality Duty. Reference to relevant sections of the Equality Act ensured that the recent ‘tongue in cheek’ campaign to ban vegans from London Dungeon was cancelled before it got off the ground and references to Article 9 rights, the protection for veganism under equality law and the Public Sector Equality Duty ensured that a vegan monitoring policy at HMP Warren Hill prison was cancelled with immediate effect.

14. The application of current law: protections for vegans

As noted above, vegans can claim a violation of their Article 9 rights if they experience unlawful interference with the manifestation of their vegan beliefs when in relationships with public bodies. Under human rights law, a public authority must not act in a way that contravenes a vegan’s right to manifest veganism. The European Court of Human Rights takes this right extremely seriously and has stated that dietary requirements are an expression of ethics in practice. As such, public entities, such as prisons, hospitals and care homes, should take care to ensure the dietary needs of vegans are met.

Under the Equality Act 2010, the public sector is also under a duty to eliminate unlawful discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between people with protected characteristics and those without protected characteristics. By complying with this duty, a public authority is less likely to breach their human rights obligations.

The Equality Act 2010 offers protection from discrimination beyond the public sector and is applicable in employment, education and in the provision of goods and services. However, ethical vegans experiencing discrimination should not assume that everyone knows they hold a protected belief and should make sure requests for accommodation of needs refer to their protected status. In a case prior to the 2020 Casamitjana ruling, in 2018, an employment tribunal suggested that a mere statement to dietary requirements (including veganism) may not be sufficient for others to understand the requirement to be related to a protected belief. Protection for vegans does not currently extend to dietary veganism and vegans should seek professional guidance before taking action.

The following examples illustrate how Article 9 and the Equality Act have been applied in favour of vegans and veganism in both the public and private sectors:

A) School/students:

• Pupils’ dietary needs accommodated.
• Funded provision of plant-based alternative to cow’s milk in Early Years (Scotland).
• Provision of vegan-inclusive library books.
• Approved absence for alternative (to zoo/aquarium) excursion.
• Requirement to participate at a working farm cancelled.
• Funded plant-based alternative to cow’s milk (infant school).
• Art assessment needs accommodated.
• Vegan needs accommodated in food technology class.

B) Employment:

• Provision of vegan-friendly PPE (boots, shoes, gloves) for public sector workers, postal workers and warehouse workers.
• Provision of vegan-friendly uniform for security staff.
• Provision of employee-approved pension scheme.
• Rota adapted to support vegans not wishing to handle meat and dairy products.
• Adaptation of workplace training policy to accommodate vegan consideration for non-human animals.
• Out-of-court settlements for formal grievances.
• Employer-established inclusion networks.

C) Health:

• Alternative medicines provided by GP.
• Initiatives for improved labelling of medications.

D) Consumer:

• Inclusion policies adapted in the tourism industry.
• Inclusion policy amended at Merlin entertainment venue, London Dungeon
• Public Sector Equality Duty applied in planning objections.
• Food Enforcement Officers promote compliance with food standards to avoid cross contamination of vegan and non-vegan foods.
• Pre Casamitjana in 2019: Discrimination against a vegan bank customer (further developments and out of court settlement for injury to feelings under the Vento Scale were unreported).

E) Prison:

• Vegans protected  by the Prison and Probation Ombubudsman

15. A caution: the continued importance of Article 9 rights

The Casamitjana case was brought under British equality law and explicitly references the protection of vegans under Article 9, the legal test adopted at the court and related human rights obligations. The importance of the process established by the European Convention on Human Rights and the significance of Article 9 must never be understated because first-stage tribunal judgments are not binding and can be reversed in future legal proceedings.[2]

As can be seen from the references above to vegetarianism, on the one hand it was postulated as an uncontroversial example of a belief within the scope of Article 9, but when put to the legal test at the tribunal it was found (controversially) not to meet the test of cogency. It has to be said that there was, and remains, strong political resistance to the protection of veganism. Guidance in support of veganism published by the Equality and Human Rights Commission in its Draft Code practice resulted in Parliamentarians commenting on the inclusion of veganism as making a farce out of equality debates, and the 2020 confirmation of veganism as a protected characteristic was said, in parliament, to be ‘idiotic’ and ‘nonsense’. In addition, the authority relied on by the Equality and Human Rights Commission—the 1993 case of CW—was regarded by The Honourable Mr Justice Burton in 2009, as being based on a concession and not binding. It is, therefore, of critical importance not to lose sight of the a priori significance of Article 9, maintain a robust application of the principles of this primary human right, cite relevant jurisprudence in cases concerning vegans and refer to the overwhelming social awareness that veganism is a belief grounded in ethics, as evidenced in additional tribunal reports.

In a case prior to the Casamitjana ruling, in 2019, it was stated at a tribunal that vegan dietary requirements are grounded in ethics and philosophical beliefs. In this case, which concerned whistleblowing and unfair dismissal, employment Judge Isaacson ruled in 2019, that Mr Ali, a restaurant employee, was unfairly dismissed because they disclosed that chicken stock was being used in all dishes advertised and sold as suitable for vegans. Recognition for vegan dietary ethics is also supported by food standards responsibilities under which food providers have a duty to store, prepare and cook vegan food separately from non-vegan food to avoid cross-contamination. Concerns about kitchen hygiene standards, including the possible contamination of vegan food which was being prepared next to fish, were acknowledged at an employment tribunal in 2022. These types of references to the social awareness of veganism as a belief grounded in ethics are important to the case for the continued recognition and protection of veganism in law.

16. Ongoing support for veganism under the Equality Act 2010

Despite political resistance and, fortunately, as seen in the cases cited above, legal reasoning reaffirms that judges overseeing cases concerning philosophical belief under British equality law remain committed to deferring to Article 9 precedents, relevant jurisprudence, and observing the rules and legal process instituted by the convention. There is also some evidence that the Casamitjana decision alone may, in future, be considered sufficient authority in tribunals deciding cases concerning veganism and judges will not feel the need to revisit setting veganism against the legal test. The potential for this is evident in tribunal reports examined below and is a welcome development, given the robust attention to law and due process in Casamitjana.

On 10 June  2022, Ms K Reilly brought a case concerning multiple issues, including an allegation of harassment related to veganism as a protected characteristic. The employment tribunal confirmed that the claimant’s veganism met the test for protection, and that being subjected to comments encouraging the claimant to eat meat, handle meat products, and having meat products waved close to their face, was unwanted conduct that created an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating and offensive environment for Ms Reilly that constituted harassment under the section 26(1)(b)(ii) of the Equality Act 2010.

In Ms Reilly’s case, the tribunal relied on the authority of Casamitjana and apart from establishing that the vegan beliefs held by the claimant perpetrated how they lived their life, the tribunal did not feel the need to detail Article 9 or the foundational human rights process and Article 9.

In addition, prior to the outcome of Ms Reilly’s case, in 2021, it was acknowledged at an employment tribunal that it would be reasonable for a vegan, who had been subjected to a one off aggressive incident of having a dish containing pork blood thrown at them, to be upset and find it offensive and/or humiliating, and that such an act would constitute  harassment on the grounds of religion or belief. This type of comment and the outcome of Ms Reilly’s case confirm that protection for veganism under British equality law is, thus far, widely accepted and uncontested.

The validity of veganism is further acknowledged by its strength as a prime example of a qualifying philosophical belief under both Article 9 and British equality law. In the following case, veganism was valued as a comparator in an assessment of a claim to a protected belief in ‘supporting Rangers football club’.

On 1 June 2022, employment Judge L Wiseman considered a case of discrimination on the grounds of a belief in supporting Rangers Football Club. The respondent in the case referred to the important elements derived from human rights law and multiple times to the relative seriousness of veganism in order to persuade the judge that a belief in supporting a football club did not meet the legal test for protection. The judge concluded that the claimant did not meet the Grainger test for protection and notably, citing veganism, stated that a qualifying belief must be one of great seriousness and importance which influences decisions and behaviour, such as the vegan belief that the relationship between humans and other creatures was of inherent importance to humanity.

Ultimately, Judge Wiseman stated, ‘I was not persuaded however that support for Rangers Football Club invoked the same respect in a democratic society as matters such as ethical veganism.’ This case illustrates the ongoing discussion about what constitutes a qualifying belief and the acceptance of the legal status of veganism as a prime example of a qualifying philosophical belief within the scope of the human right to live according to one’s lawful moral convictions.

17. The limits of protection for ‘ethical veganism’

Although the credibility of and existing protection for veganism appear, thus far, to be well-supported by judges, there will undoubtedly be further discussion about the scope of protection for different versions of vegan beliefs. In an unsuccessful case of unfair dismissal heard by an employment tribunal in 2022, Ms S Free Miles sought protection for their ‘ethical vegan’ belief that ‘animals’ lives have innate value and that humans should not eat, wear, use for sport, experiment on or profit from animals, and that humans have a moral obligation to take positive action to reduce or prevent the suffering of animals, which includes trespassing on private property to expose animal suffering and the removal of suffering animals’. In this case, the complainant extends the definition of The Vegan Society to including a moral imperative to engage in unlawful action to protect other animals from exploitation and suffering.

To determine whether the claimant’s specific vegan belief qualified as a philosophical belief under the Equality Act 2010, the tribunal was obliged to refer to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, statutory obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998, and invoke the, by now well-established, Grainer test. Having considered relevant factors, the tribunal concluded that had the belief been limited to lawful practices, it would have had no reservation in concluding that it met the legal test for protection, but since it was a belief that involved unlawful activity, it could not be a protected philosophical belief under the Equality Act 2010.

The tribunal cited both Article 9 of the convention and the test adopted for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010, as limiting practices associated with protected beliefs to those that are worthy of respect in a democracy, which exclude, therefore, unlawful acts. In addition, the tribunal concluded that unlawful activity was not a manifestation of Ms Free Miles’ belief that humans should not eat, wear, use for sport, experiment on or profit from animals. This element of the belief, they concluded, would amount to a philosophical belief: a view entirely consistent with Casamitjana.

This case illustrates how Article 9 and the human rights process come back into play when subjective or nuanced definitions of ethical veganism and specific manifestations require reassessment for compatibility with the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as referenced by the Equality Act 2010. It also illustrates, once more, that protection for the vegan belief that humans should not eat, wear, use for sport, experiment on or profit from animals is supported by well-established human rights principles and, thus far, uncontested.

18. Conclusion and celebration

As can be seen from the discussion above, the human rights system, established by the European Convention on Human Rights, and the application of Article 9 to the case of CW, the vegan prisoner, are formative to the current legal status and protection of veganism under British equality law. It seems absurd that people need to apply for the protection of law to help them avoid participating in the exploitation of non-human animals and protect them from discrimination simply because they wish to practise compassion. It seems especially bizarre when we remind ourselves that the vast majority of people care about the suffering of other animals and wouldn’t knowingly cause them harm.

Fortunately, the right to believe in compassion for other animals and the lawful practices that accompany those moral beliefs are respected under the Article 9 right to freedom of conscience. Claiming this right in itself, and through the right to equal treatment and protection from discrimination under the Equality Act 2010, protects vegans and thereby facilitates policies and practices that make veganism more accessible and sustainable. This in turn helps advance veganism and dismantle prejudice towards other animals.

The protection afforded to vegans under Article 9 brings into sharp focus the moral standing of other animals and their suffering, and shines a light on protection for compassionate living. In a world where other animals are excluded from a protective rights framework themselves, legal protection for vegans is surely worth celebrating.

Recommended citation: Rowley, J, ‘Celebrating 30 years of legal recognition for veganism: the importance of human rights to the development of legal protection for vegans in the UK’, The Vegan Society, 2023

The views expressed by our Research News contributors are not necessarily the views of The Vegan Society.

The Vegan Society: Supporting Veganism in the Workplace

Jeanette.rowley[at]vegansociety[dot]com

knowyourrights[at]vegansociety[dot]com